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Imagined Communities of Global Risk

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A major challenge today is the development of dialogue and cooperation across cultural and civilizational worlds. When different national interests come into play obstacles in developing long term condition of cooperation are increased, contradicting national interests. Overcoming major political and cultural divisions is one of the most challenging tasks of the present day. My lecture is addressed to this problem in a very specific way. Its basic thesis is: Global risks not only mean the potentiality of unknown catastrophes to humanity, but at the same time and precisely because of this an unknown opportunity to create structures and institutions for cooperation, beyond borders. This window of opportunity is the other side of the financial crisis as well as of climate change and terrorist threat but also SARS, swine influenza virus etc. Thus the reflexivity of world risk society releases a 'cosmopolitan moment', a 'cosmopolitan momentum'. In order to conceptualize this in social scientific terms there is a need to turn the often misunderstood concept of cosmopolitanism from its philosophical head onto its social scientific feet. So today I have come to you with a sociological vision and mission: a paradigm shift towards a cosmopolitan sociology of risk which I shall now develop in three steps:

First, I will call into question one of the most powerful convictions about society and politics, one which binds both social actors and social scientists: *methodological nationalism*. Methodological nationalism equates modern society with society organised in territorially limited nation states.

Second, I propose to draw an essential distinction between *cosmopolitanism* in a normative philosophical sense and *cosmopolitanization* as a social scientific research programme. I want to focus on methodological cosmopolitanism, on the epistemological shift from a national to a cosmopolitan outlook. The aim is to open up a new field of research, theory and debate, addressing cosmopolitan reality at the beginning of the 21st century.

Third, confronted with global risks (like economic crisis, climate change, terrorist threat) or, to put it in terms of social theory, under conditions of world risk society, we have to redefine the concept of imagined community, so beautifully outlined by Benedict Anderson, in relation to imagined cosmopolitan communities of global risks.

1. Critique of methodological nationalism

In brief: Methodological nationalism assumes that the nation, state and society are the 'natural' social and political forms of the modern world. Where social actors subscribe to this belief I talk of a 'national *outlook*'; where it determines the perspective of the social scientific observer, I talk of '*methodological nationalism*'. The distinction between the perspective of the social actor and that of the social scientist is crucial, because there is only a historical connection between the two, not a logical one. The rise of sociology in Europe coincided with the rise of the nation state, nationalism and the system of international politics. You have a different tradition here, but we all know how European social concepts have entered American sociological debates - and the other way around, of course. This historical connection – between social actors and social scientists – alone gives rise to the axiomatics of methodological nationalism. And methodological nationalism is not a superficial problem or minor error. It involves both the routines of data collection and production and basic concepts of modern sociology and political science like society, social inequality, state, democracy, imagined communities, multiculturalism but it blocks also the understanding of the

cosmopolitan factor as is illustrated by increasing transnational cooperation within Asia and between China, the US, EU, Africa and so on.

2. The crucial distinction between normative cosmopolitanization and empirical-analytical cosmopolitanization

We can distinguish three phases in the way the word 'globalisation' has been used in the social sciences: first, denial, second, conceptual refinement and empirical research, third, 'cosmopolitanization'. The initial reaction of mainstream sociology was or is to deny the reality or relevance of globalisation and to declare that nothing that came under the heading of 'globalisation' on the social scientific agenda was historically new.

This explaining-away of globalisation began to lose credibility in the second phase. Now social scientists in the most diverse areas began to subject phenomena of globalisation to conceptual analysis and to situate them in the theoretical and empirical semantics of the social sciences (e.g. David Held et al., *Global Transformations*, 1999). This refinement revealed a new social landscape in the making. Its dominant features include interconnectedness, which means dependency and interdependency of people across the globe. Virtually the entire span of human experiences and practices is in one way or another influenced by the overwhelming interconnectivity of the world. (This is not to be confused with world system and dependency theories.)

The third phase uncovers the core unseen, unwanted consequence of this global interconnectivity: the end of the 'global other'. The global other is here in our midst. And this, finally, is where the distinction between *cosmopolitanism* and really existing cosmopolitanization comes in.

Cosmopolitanism in Immanuel Kant's philosophical sense means something active, a task, a conscious and voluntary choice, clearly the affair of an elite. I prefer to talk about mundane or everyday cosmopolitanization, drawing attention to the fact that an increasingly cosmopolitan reality simultaneously produces unwanted and unobserved side-effects that are not intended as 'cosmopolitan' in the normative sense. A 'banal' and 'coercive'

cosmopolitanization unfolds beneath the surface or behind the façade of persisting national spaces, jurisdictions and labels, even as national flags continue to be raised and national attitudes, identities and consciousness remain dominant. Cosmopolitanization can be studied in many fields: in relation to migration, social inequality, family, science, state and international relationships, but is also very evidently when it comes to global risks or, more precisely, manufactured uncertainties. This can be illustrated by the consequences the global financial crisis has for the relationship between the Asian countries or China and the USA: *Global recovery rests on a fresh US and EU approach to China*. The key relationship for any global recovery is between the US and China. The Chinese citizen has funded the credit-driven American consumer boom: or, to put it another way, China's government has enabled the US to run an enormous current account deficit by buying huge quantities of US treasury bills. If China stops this, the value of the US Dollar would plunge, and a bitter trade war, engulfing the rest of the world, could ensue.

This *inter*-dependency is new. There has always been an *asymmetry* at the heart of the relationship. China once needed the American market and its cooperation more than America needed China. From the outset of the reform programme, Deng Xiaoping made it clear that American cooperation would be a precondition of its success. But the balance of power has now been transformed and, whether or not it chooses to recognize effect, the US needs Chinese cooperation as much as China needs the US's. I have eight theses.

First thesis: the endemic nature of global risks creates a new 'cosmopolitan civilisational shared destiny' or a new global civility, which does have quite different implications in different contexts and paths of modernization.

Global crises and risks contradict methodological nationalism. They are not confined within national borders nor can their causal responsibility be analysed through a national lens. Their effects are felt across sovereign national boundaries and they can also become subject to systems of governance and forms of civil society responses that are transnational in

scope. I place global threats and crises centre stage in theorising the global age, extending my ideas of 'Risk Society' (1986) to 'World Risk Society' (1999) and 'World at Risk' (2006), and distinguish three axes of world crises, namely ecological, economic and terrorist interdependency crises.

A cosmopolitan outlook means that, in a world of global crises and of dangers produced by civilisation, the old dualisms of internal and external, national and international, us and them, lose their validity and the imagined community of cosmopolitanism becomes essential to survival. This perspective of 'coercive cosmopolitanization' opens up the possibility that the 'manufactured uncertainties' and 'manufactured insecurities' produced by world risk society prompt transnational reflexivity, global co-operation and co-ordinated responses – though these same processes may also prompt exactly the opposite!

Thus the public reflection of the financial crisis creates an awareness of the interconnectedness and releases the 'cosmopolitan moment' in the US-Chinese relationship: This requires a very different mindset in Washington. As the previously unrivalled global hegemon, the United States is not used to dealing with other countries as equals. Obviously this has been the case in the Bush's presidency, but it has been so ever since 1945. Obama's presidency does or could have a 'cosmopolitan vision': It recognizes, that American power is not what it used to be and it is starting a self-transformation of US-politics in light of the encounter with others in responses to the challenges of globality.

China, still a poor country, it should be remembered, is feeling the effect of the financial crisis with a declining growth rate and rising unemployment. Thus the magic of 'decoupling' the Chinese economy from the rest of the world has been proven an illusion. And here is the 'cosmopolitan imperative': There can be no salvation in domestic recovery alone; in a globalized world, every country's domestic recovery will be intimately linked to a wider global recovery, which requires a new kind of global cooperation.

At the same time the cosmopolitan imperative gives a measure for profound criticism of the international organisations and institutions: There can be no solution that relies on the old G8 and the institutions of Breton Woods, namely the IMF and World Bank. The architect, patron and prime beneficiary of the system, the US, is simply no longer powerful enough to underwrite it. This was implicitly recognized by the decision to have a meeting of the G20, rather than simply the G8, again a few days ago in Pittsburgh. China's Premier made this point at Davos, when he called for a new world economic order. But simplistic demands for a revitalization of the IMF demonstrate that Western minds are still living in the past: Any refinancing depends primarily on China and China's Prime Minister Wen, has made it crystal-clear that China will not provide any funds for the IMF until there is a wholesale reform of the organisation. While it is dominated by the US and Europe, China does not regard it as the kind of global institution it can support in the only way that counts – with its huge resources. Breton Woods is on a life-support-machine.

Any global recovery depends on a new financial architecture, that has a cosmopolitan vision: It has to acknowledge the decline of developed countries and the rise of the developing world, notably China. This will require a new kind humility on the part of the US and the recognition that it must share power with a range of new stakeholders, especially China. If the US and the EU are *not* going down this road, the result will be the opposite: A growing protectionism and the possibility of a trade war and (sooner or later) a second Great Depression.

The key to any solution is not simply a continuation of the positive relationship between China and the US, but a cosmopolitan vision on *both* sides. Does china have a vision for the global order including the recognition of the other besides economic growth and nationalism defining China's future role in making the world a better place? Not only a cooperation, but a *transforming* cooperation is necessary which changes the institutional structures and self understandings of the nation states involved and the international organisations.

The argument advanced here is that global risks constitute *varieties* of cosmopolitanism and mark the emergence of new kinds of relations between the societies. Unlike many approaches to intercultural dialogue the cosmopolitan vision suggests a transformation in self-understanding and not merely a better awareness of the perspective of the other. Moreover, it also requires a change in policy – making as apposed to merely a change in consciousness.

Second thesis: I emphasise the staging in world risk society. That follows from the central theoretical preoccupation with ‘new global risks’ defined, essentially, as those manmade, incalculable, uninsurable threats and catastrophes that are anticipated.

Anticipation implies prevention. But those risks often remain invisible and their perceived existence and the politics of prevention depends, therefore, on how they become defined and contested in ‘knowledge’. That is, global risks are socially constructed and defined in terms of corresponding power relations of definition. Their existence takes the form of (scientific and alternative scientific) knowledge. Consequently their ‘reality’ can be dramatised or minimised, transformed or simply denied according to the norms which decide what is known and what is not. Hence they are the (more or less successful) results of staging. Crucially, therefore, global crises are extremely dependent on global news media. Indeed, when staged in the media, global risks can become *cosmopolitan events* with a potentially explosive global reach. In this perspective cosmopolitan events are highly mediatised, highly selective, highly variable, highly symbolic, local and global, national and international, material and communitive, reflexive experiences and blows of fate. They transcend and efface all social boundaries and overturn the global order that holds sway in people’s minds.

As long ago as 1927 John Dewey was already asking ‘for conditions under which a Great Society may become the great community’. He distinguished between collectively binding *decisions* on the one hand and their *consequences* on the other. He linked this to the theory that a public sphere

only ever emerges at the focal point of public communication, *not* out of any general interest in binding decisions but, rather, as a result of their *consequences*. People remain indifferent to decisions as such. It is not until they begin to communicate with one another about the problematic consequences of decisions that they wake up. It is communication that shakes them out of their complacency and makes them worry. It shakes them out of their indifference, creating a public sphere and a potential community of action. I would put it this way, it is global risk – or, more precisely, the staging and the perception of global risk – that creates imagined communities across all kinds of boundaries. It is the reflexivity of world risk society that produces the reciprocal relationship between the public sphere and globality.

The only institutions which are just as global and operate in real time just as the financial system does, are the *mass media*. And it is indeed the case that the world media and the news media in different countries through their intensive reporting created an awareness of a problem which they describe as global and the result of economic interdependencies. The interesting aspect is not the reporting of the media as such. And nor is it the fact, that media audiences come into contact with news items with a global implication, which have consequences both for themselves and for strangers in distant places. The most interesting thing is – as Jakob Arnoldi argues – the fact, that the reception of such media reporting creates an awareness that strangers in distant places *are following the same events with the same fears and worries as oneself*. Strangers become neighbours!

A further condition which can create imagined communities of risk lies in the potential *reflexivity* of the public spheres – and of the world public sphere. Imagined communities of global risks can then arise when the mass media (Internet, mobile phones) not only constitute a forum for the exchange of information, but also produce an awareness that this exchange is taking place. As Benedict Anderson (cf. Anderson 1983) has shown so brilliantly, it was this conscious recognition of the fact, that one is following the development of the same events simultaneously with others and is affected in common with them, that was an original basis of nationalism – “imagined

communities". But from that there follows the question, what will be the effect, when global crises like the present financial crisis (but also the catastrophic effects of climate change or the threat presented by nuclear weapons) are followed as part of an audience that transcends nation state boundaries? And from that there also follows the next question: what is the relationship between national and cosmopolitan imagined communities? Benedict Anderson reserved the concept of "imagined communities" for national constructs, and there is good reason to suppose that he, like many others, considers imagined communities to apply *only* to nations. I on the other hand am concerned with this question: whether the concept of imagined cosmopolitan communities is suitable, in a new, expanded form, for exploring the social and political consequences of global risks?

Third thesis: The relationship between cosmopolitanization is, nevertheless, neither inevitable nor linear; instead cosmopolitanization can do the exact opposite, leading to re-nationalisation, re-ethnicization etc., as can at present be observed in Europe as well as in many other parts of the globe.

Imposed communities of global risk should not be confused with imagined communities. If today there is something that is shared in common across the globe, then this: How can the imposition of cosmopolitanism be shaken off and the certainties and limits of the national be restored? It is also necessary, therefore, to firmly pose the counter question and seek to answer it empirically: Under what conditions does the objective shared destiny of global risks *not* (or only to a limited degree and temporarily) produce imagined cosmopolitan communities? When, therefore, does it lead to a strengthening of imagined *national* communities? Three research questions may be distinguished here:

First: Global risk management divides the world through its very logic: there are elite decision makers who take on or allay risks and then there is collateral damage, that is, those who bear the burden – the "unseen side effects" – of those distant decisions.

Second: if it is true, that the world political power of global risks is based essentially on their mass media presence and staging then that also means, the other way around, that the community shaping power of global risks is *precarious*. More precisely: it threatens to collapse, when the mass media agenda changes. The question arises, therefore, as to the *durability* (or conditions of durability) of global perceptions of risk.

The sociology of cosmopolitanization, therefore, does not claim to determine the direction, never mind the result of the global transformation; and it is very far from assuming the existence of a world-historical subject of cosmopolitanism. Rather, it opens up various paths and sites of cosmopolitanization and the consequent diverse and contradictory answers to global problem situations. And yet there remains (this): Cosmopolitanization accentuates a *cosmopolitan imperative* which no one in any corner of the world whatsoever can avoid, without endangering his own interests in survival. The “bonds” which characterise cosmopolitan communities should not, therefore, be misunderstood as the fleeting lightness of fluid human interests, unable to bear any strain – “thin cosmopolitanism”, so to speak. They are based, rather, on the combination of particular national and individual interests with the materiality of causal chains of effect. They establish a link between the most fundamental interests of nations (and individuals) and the new, unbounded spaces and duties of a responsibility for the survival of all. The community initiating power of risk depends on realism and not simply on sympathy, regret and pity for the suffering of others – that is what is meant by “thick cosmopolitanism”.

That raises the question: How can national and cosmopolitan communities be distinguished in ideal-typical terms and what is their relationship with each other?

Fourth thesis: National communities are understood as limited and exclusive. Cosmopolitan communities, on the other hand, imagined as unbounded and inclusive; inclusive, however, in a very particular sense: Cosmopolitanization is not the dichotomous Other of nationalism.

Cosmopolitanism/cosmopolitanization does not exclude the nations, it includes them. The mutually exclusive duality between national and cosmopolitan does, however, exist in the *national* view of things. That is a significant cause of misunderstanding. Anyone who, unable to escape the national gaze, asserts that national and cosmopolitan is an either-or matter, fails to recognise the special quality of “both one thing and the other” of national and cosmopolitan which the cosmopolitan gaze takes for granted.

No nation presents itself as identical with humanity. The idea that a nation dreams of converting and integrating all the human beings of humanity is out of the question. Not least because each individual nation presumes the duality of national and international. Nor does cosmopolitanism imply the dream of creating a community with all, as Christians in some epochs dreamed of converting the whole planet to Christianity. Cosmopolitanism means, rather, this: All nations, all religions, all ethnic groups, all classes etc. are and see themselves compelled, given the development of civilisation and its potential for self-destruction, to constitute a community with a common destiny in the interests of survival.

The imagined communities of risk are – as has been said – imposed communities, communities with a common destiny. They are *not* based – as cosmopolitanism seems to imply – on voluntariness, choice, an elite status, normativeness and philosophical insight. The cosmopolitan risk community is precisely *not* based on the insight, that we are all members of a community of humankind. What might be called the “good Samaritan effect” is *not* sufficient: that is, that in a Christian or cosmopolitan exercise of neighbourly love we act in solidarity with others who are vulnerable, suffering, whose humanity is threatened or being destroyed. Instead it is we who are forced, in our own most pressing interest in survival, not only to address those distant others, but to come together with them in order to devise a new kind of community and a new kind of politics and to fight for its achievement.

Global risk is a protective barrier, woven of the means of communication, against the particular vulnerability of mankind to the threats it itself has created. Global risks link people, who actually don't have anything to do with one another (or don't want to). Global risks mean that national peculiarities – culture, language, religion, law – have to be pushed into the background in order to allow co-operation across borders and differences, even where hostility exists. All of this takes place *not* as the deliberate implementation of the normative ideas of cosmopolitanism, but unintentionally, behind the backs of the actors. Out of the experience of global threat situations and risk interdependencies there can emerge (in particular circumstances and only then, see above), more or less involuntarily, a pressure to co-operate. Accompanying it there would be a politicisation and establishment of norms, not, however, as the application of the marvellous thoughts of a great philosopher to the world.

A central characteristic of both forms of community is that the history of their emergence is closely linked to the rise of new communications technologies. Nevertheless, these are technologies of a quite different kind. Whereas the imagined national communities, as Benedict Anderson shows, are based on the invention and mass production of the printed *book*, imagined cosmopolitan communities depend on the *Internet* and the worldwide communications and mobility processes, networks, forums of debate etc. which the former makes possible.

Fifth thesis: Both types of imagined communities, that is, national as well cosmopolitan, have in common, that they are not a matter of choice, but are givens. But with an important difference: In the national case the given is a matter of origin, in the cosmopolitan case it is the future.

Imagined national communities are rooted in the past (which must likewise be decoded as 'imagined past', since in the eyes of the nationalists such a past is – subjectively – ancient, whereas in the perspective of the historian origin it can be dated to the beginning of European modernity). Imagined cosmopolitan communities in contrast are rooted in the future anticipated in

the present. For the first time in history all human beings, all ethnic and religious groups, all populations inhabit the common present of a threatened future of civilisation. Here the question arises again: How common is this common present? Because this “common present” of an omnipresent threatened future is not based on a common past. On the contrary: Cosmopolitanization through imagined catastrophes (which for many are really suffered catastrophes!) comes up against the great variety of pasts and the hostilities of pasts, conceived as national past and future. That is, there is a collision between the principles of nationality (territoriality, border, sovereignty, exclusion of the national others) and the principles of cosmopolitanism (border-transcending solidarity, inclusion of the national others, causal responsibility). And this is no doubt where one of the many blockades may be located, when imposed cosmopolitanization does not turn into conscious cosmopolitanism, but is often or even in the majority of cases answered by re-nationalisation.

Sixth thesis: Yet here there is a decisive difference. The strength, the survival of the nation depends ultimately on the readiness of each member of this nation to sacrifice his life for it. Action in world risk society is based on the complete opposite, that the interest in survival of all becomes the self-interest of each individual.

Cosmopolitan community is not conceived, therefore, like the national community, as a sworn comradeship, whose cohesion, strength and eternal duration, are based on the idea that it is an honour for each individual to die for the fatherland. (*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*) The cosmopolitan emergency community disenchants this national myth: not *dying* but *surviving!* is the motto here. More precisely: in order to ensure the survival of all a worldwide collective learning process in a very brief space of time (“fast learning”) is required. All nations, all religions, all ethnic groups and the individuals belonging to them must work towards reducing national and religious conflicts and foe images, so that they do not hinder the possibility of “saving co-operation”. In other words: *Particularities yes, foe images no!* Or: *imposed emancipation* – what is to be done, must be recognised and done

now and without delay. Otherwise the crisis will turn into a catastrophe, the community of fate into a community of downfall. Global risks, taken seriously create a new absence of doubt and of ambiguity! Here are the roots of totalitarian fundamentalisms!

The national community becomes an integral part of the cosmopolitan community, but must at the same time change structurally, open itself up. Nationalism does not imagine and construct the otherness of the others according to the principle of above and below, but in accordance with the distinction of inside and outside. Internally it dissolves distinctions and unifies the sphere of validity of norms. It has this in common with universalism. It is an *internal* universalism, whose universal claim ends where other nations begin. Hence in its external relations the nation can oscillate between enlightened tolerance and nationalist excess. Under conditions of the cosmopolitanization of the national that is no longer easily possible. The foe images of nations must be dismantled, other nations can no longer be denied equality. More than that: it is necessary – out of a quite egoistical interest in survival! – to learn to see not only the position of others, but to see oneself through the eyes of others. Consequently in order to overcome global problems it is necessary to open up a new *space of action of causal responsibility*.

Seventh thesis: An essential difference between national and cosmopolitan community, therefore, is this: National empathy is replaced by a causal responsibility as a transnational space of potential obligation to the nationally excluded others.

Global risks, too, are the product of collective decisions. Their consequences can and are systematically shifted onto others, because and as long as national communities draw clear boundaries between those profiting from industrialisation processes and those “recipients of residual risk” whose very existence is threatened (see above).

Unlike national communities, however, cosmopolitan communities are *no territorial* communities, but *non-territorial and overlapping communities* with the most diverse affiliations. Nevertheless these imagined communities, too, have to be *created*, even where they are ‘socially constructed givens’ as (civilisatory) communities with a shared destiny. Their creation coincides with the definition and staging of risks against a background of (changing) global power relations of definition (“meta power”). The nature of these ties (“acknowledgment”) and what follows from them: establishing justice, contradicts the life/death and to be/not to be pathos of the national. The cosmopolitan community is not engaged in establishing bonds between the dead and the unborn, that is, with the mystery of regeneration. Instead, in the thousand large and small conflict dynamics of world risk society it is a matter of breaking up and overcoming the container conception of the national. It is, not least, this *national relativism* (which is in the national interest itself) which could make of imagined cosmopolitan communities something realistic.

That can succeed, however, only under one very demanding and hence fragile condition: All actors and organisations would also have to think the repercussions of the decisions of others along with the effect of their own actions on the others. A degree of consensus has to be found in this active combination (“transnational resonance”), because otherwise the risk that affects all cannot be significantly minimised. (Is there an everyday model we can refer to? Yes, the behaviour of car drivers!)

Eighth thesis: A Copernican spirit is urgently required in order to redefine the concept of the state beyond methodological nationalism. Because in the same way as imagined national communities are grounded in the nation state, so the imagined cosmopolitan communities are or should be grounded in a different form(ation) of statehood. The key question, of course, is which form of statehood? And how do we get there?

In answering this question, it is important to distinguish between *simple co-operation*, which leaves the co-operating state actors largely unaffected, and *transformative co-operation*, which alters them. Drawing on the studies of

Robert Axelrod (1984), we can assume that the probability of transformatory co-operation increases with the frequency of interaction. The longer the shadow of global risk, the greater the incentives for the actors involved to co-operate and the greater the probability that the preferences of the actors, and ultimately of the state itself, will thereby undergo change. This is precisely the case in Europe. The EU might become a model for climate change policies, for example. Climate change as an aspect of Europeanisation is not a discrete event and cannot be understood as a one-off act of co-operation that leaves the nation states involved unaffected (as the inter-governmental perspective assumes). In order to be effective climate change policies have to alter both the forms of state authority concerned and national sovereignty *to their very core*. Nation states have become *transnational* states. Which means, that nation states need to develop and practice *reflexive self-limiting strategies in their own best interest*. They refrain with good reason from exercising their remaining sovereignty: to maximise their national interests.

Cosmopolitanism is not the same thing as altruism or idealism but is realism, more precisely, *the reflected self-interest of transnational states*. This can be read, in turn, as an example of the inner *cosmopolitanization of the national* based on the interplay between three mechanisms: (1) the prospect of increases in power; (2) interactive constraints and controls; (3) a shift in preferences through *policy learning*.

Under these conditions, it would be fatal to assume (as does neorealism) that national preferences are unalterable givens. Otherwise politics would be in constant danger of being drawn into a vicious circle of refusal of co-operation. Empirical research on Europe has shown that such a constellation is avoidable. Actors are quite capable of *learning* and changing their preferences, especially under conditions of marked interdependence and intensive communication (see Sandholz, Stone and Sweet 1998; Eising 2001). This has far-reaching theoretical and practical implications, because then preferences are no longer independent but *dependent* variables, related to experiences of global risks.

I am coming to the end of my lecture and instead of summarizing, let me at least touch the question: What do the arising imagined Communities of Global Risk mean in the Asian context? Of course, I am not the person to answer this question (there are more competent others in this room) and, no doubt, there is a profound European bias in my argument. But let me stimulate our discussion with two observations:

(1): The stronger adherence to national sovereignty in Asia should not lead one to the conclusion that Asian nationalisms have blocked the development of cosmopolitanism and that cosmopolitanism is merely an ideal without any substance. Historically, the idea of cosmopolitanism emerged in the context of liberal nationalism in the 19th century. Theoretically speaking, *nationalism and cosmopolitanism are complementary and mutually implicated* (Delanty, 2006). Indeed, the result of the Asia barometer demonstrates moderately strong positive correlation between Asian regional identity and national identity with high levels of Asian regional identity being associated with high levels of national identity. There are cosmopolitan consequences arising out of the Chinese pursuit of national self-interest: Hu Jintao, the president of the People's Republic of China, for example, announced in the 2006 Sino-African Summit in Beijing that China would double aid to Africa by 2009 and create an investment fund of US\$5 billion. In his trip to eight African countries in February 2007, President Hu cancelled Cameroon's debt, Sudan's US\$19 million debt, the US\$15 million of debt Liberia owed to China and the US\$15 million debt Mozambique owes China. Tony Blair's call for cancellation of African debt has been realized by the Chinese government and the unintentional consequence of this has contributed to the development of a cosmopolitan outlook and the partial realization of global redistributive justice.

(2) The driving forces for cosmopolitanism come not only from migrants and nation-states, but also from *non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intellectuals*. There is growing democratization in Asia, where the worldwide pursuit of democracy has been much in evidence. One of the most important developments in Asia has been the spread of civil society, a development that is closely linked to wealth creation and urbanization. Various NGOs and intellectuals in Asia seek international linkage and form transnational

cooperation in all areas, even in the most thorny area of redefining national identity, challenging the WTO's rule and creating a new type of global social contract (He, 2004; He and Murphy, 2007).

Let me come back to my basic point: All of those questions can only meaningfully put into research and discussed and finally be answered if we engage in a *cosmopolitanization of the social sciences*, conceptually, methodologically and organizationally.